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This article is devoted to economical aspects of Human Computation (HC) and
to perspectives of HC in economics. As of economical aspects of HC, it is first
observed that much of what makes HC systems effective is economical in nature
suggesting that complexity being reconsidered as a “HC complexity” and the con-
ception of efficient HC systems as a “HC economics”. This article also points to the
relevance of HC in the development of standard software and to the importance of
competition in HC systems. As of HC in economics, it is first argued that markets
can be seen as HC systems avant la lettre. Looking more closely at financial mar-
kets, the article then points to a speed differential between transactions and credit
risk awareness that compromises the efficiency of financial markets. Finally, a HC-
based credit risk rating is proposed that, overcoming the afore mentioned speed
differential, holds promise for better functioning financial markets.
Human Computation Economics
In working at ensuring the success of the gaming platform MetropolItalia1, the aim of which
is to collect data for a linguistic study on the divergence of italian vernaculars and dialects, we
investigated the following issues:
• Incentives: What are the factors motivating both the potential users of the HC system to
try it and its actual users to behave as it is needed?2
• Self-sufficiency. Does the HC system as a whole, or a part of it (like a single game),
generate all data it needs for its proper working or does it require to regularly acquire new
data from external systems (like other games)?
A self-sufficient HC system is necessary if a first success is not to end up in a failure.
Indeed, an increase in the number of users of a HC system in general calls for an increase
of the data it relies upon. If a HC system is not self-sufficient, then the more popular it
1http://beta.metropolitalia.org
2MetropolItalia must makes its users produce vernacular or dialectal sentences in a context where they might use
standard Italian.
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becomes, the more human work does its proper working require. At some point, more
human work might be necessary than can be provided with. The HC system then fails to
satisfy its users and looses its audience.
• Efficiency: Are the users participating in the HC system doing so as (among other with
the intensity and at the speed) the HC system needs?
A HC system might provide the right incentives for its users to contribute as needed and
be self-sufficient but none the less be inefficient if it does not attract enough human work
for performing its task in the desired time.
• Expandability: Is the HC system capable of growing in the sense of attracting more
human participation?
Expandability of HC systems involves traditional algorithmic complexity as well as as
psychology, especially work organisation and social psychology, a mix we propose to call
“Human Computation Complexity”.
Incentives, self-sufficiency, efficiency and expendability are economical properties usually
considered in investigating macro-systems such as countries and markets and micro-systems
such as businesses. The amount of human computation a HC system makes possible can be
seen as the wealth it generates. The field concerned with the conception of HC systems can be
called “Human Computation Economics”. Indeed, economics is the field concerned with the
production, consumption, and transfer of wealth [13].
Competitiveness of Human Computation
HC has become popular with aesthetic selection (or interactive evolutionary computation) [6],
serious games [31], games with a purpose (GWAP) [27], and reCAPTCHA [29] because it pro-
vides with practical solutions to problems that cannot not be solved without involving humans.
We argue that HC also has a potential for problems that can be solved with no human aid, pro-
vided it gives rise to systems simpler, and consequently cheaper, to develop and to maintain.
The potential of HC where computing solutions without involving humans are possible is
illustrated on two examples. The first example is that of a navigation system. Reporting and
predicting traffic congestions require no HC. However, provided a navigation system has enough
users, data as reliable as sensor data can be collected from the users’ positions. This way, the
costs of deploying and maintaining a sensor infrastructure are partly or completely avoided. The
price to pay for the approach is the disclosure by its users of their positions to the system. The
incentives for users to do so is the traffic information they are provided with.
The second example is a Germany-wide university application and registration system. Since
German universities do not detect early enough students who do not take a place they have been
offered, a significant number of university places remain unoccupied for as long as a year. In
order to reduce the number of lost places, a central registration system is under development that
will immediately inform all German universities a student applied at when that student takes a
place she has been offered by one of them. A rather simple HC approach would make the com-
plex information interchange between a central system and all German universities unnecessary:
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Requiring high enough a deposit with each application and refunding this deposit on the appli-
cation’s withdrawal would incite students to provide the universities with the information they
need for immediately re-assigning free places.
Both examples describe self-sufficient, efficient and expandable solutions that critically de-
pend on incentives, that is, HC economical solutions. The HC systems have a lower algorithmic,
or traditional, complexity than their HC-free counterparts because they shift some tasks to hu-
mans.
Admittedly, examples are no evidences. We argue, however, that considering HC as an option
and think in terms of HC Economics and HC Complexity often would, like in the two examples
given above, make software simpler, and therefore cheaper to develop and to maintain.
Competition in Human Computation
Markets are very successful at the regulation of economical systems because they make it the
concern of each economical agent: In a well-functioning market economy, the striving of each
agent for its own wealth maximises the collective wealth. Will competition, an essential feature
of market economies, become a characteristic of successful HC systems? There are good reasons
to think so.
First, competition between users for the reward (real or play money, badges, status, etc.) re-
sulting from success in using a HC system is often an important incentive to use the system. User
competition is also often convenient a means towards an HC system’s efficiency because good
performances in a competition for rewards often are an incentive in themselves. Exploiting com-
petition as an inventive for a GWAP suggests devising adaptive [12], collective scoring schemes,
that is, scoring schemes such that the reward of a player for her contribution depends as well on
other players’ contributions. Collective scoring schemes usually contribute to the attractiveness
of a GWAP. Indeed, collective scoring give a social dimension to a game or strengthen its social
dimension, if it already has one.
Adaptive scoring schemes, and more generally adaptive HC systems, that is, scoring schemes
and HC systems that adapt to a single player’s behaviour, or to the behaviour of a players’
community, so as to better achieve the HC system’s objectives, are promising research issues. In
investigating adaptive HC systems, a key issue is the interplay between incentive and efficiency.
This issue reaches to psychology. It is an issue of the afore mentioned HC complexity.
Competition between HC systems, in particular between adaptable HC systems, might con-
tribute to the efficiency of HC systems. Often, the sub-systems of an HC system, like the differ-
ent GWAPs of a gaming platform, compete with each other for the users’ attention. It happens
sometimes that a sub-system attracts too many users, reducing the efficiency of the overall HC
system.
We are faced with this problem with our GWAP platform ARTigo3 the aims of which are the
development of a semantic search engine for art works and art work perception analysis. The
games Sentiment and TagATag4 we specifically designed to generate semantically rich data (like
3http://artigo.org
4At the time of writing this article, Sentiment and TagATag are on a beta version of ARTigo accessible by selected
users.
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“sad smile” and “ambiguously inviting”) tend to be less visited than ARTigo’s ESP game [28]
and Karido [23] that both generate useful but more trivial data (like “woman” and “hut”). So as
to gain more semantically rich tags, we are investigating making ARTigo’s games adaptable. We
consider making games played too often to the detriment of others to select images more difficult
to tag, for example images that in the past have been less tagged than average, or images that
have been tagged with rarer, or more sophisticated, tags than average.
User competition for gaming performances and game competition for users’ attention are
useful means for the efficiency of GWAP platforms. We argue that they are more generally
important issues of HC Economics. Indeed, games are always related to real life, serious, activ-
ities.5
Adaptive scoring schemes and adaptive HC systems probably can be achieved by markets –
like the market-based HC system for decision making described in [15]– where the competitors
(users, HC (sub-)systems, software agents acting for users or for HC (sub-)systems) offer and
purchase some fictive goods. The challenge of such a market-based approach to adaptation is to
appropriately design markets, that is, to select the goods traded with, to specify the behaviour
of the robot traders, the start capital of the (human and robot) traders, the market-making mech-
anism, and most importantly what information is available to the (human and robot) traders.
Especially appealing would be to rely on HC in realising a market for adaptation, that is, to
conceive a first HC system as a market making a second HC system adapt as desired. Such a
market in turn could be offered as a GWAP on a gaming platform. Indeed, speculation has a
gaming side that cannot be denied!
The Invisible Hand as Human Computation
Markets can be seen as HC system avant la lettre because on markets traders perform the fol-
lowing “computations”, even though they did so in the past without computer support and they
do so today partly without market-related computer support:
1. Interpreting information on the goods traded with
2. Adjusting the trading prices
On a market there might also be one or several (human oder computerised, institutional or non-
institutional) market-makers [11] ensuring the market liquidity by selling (purchasing, resp.) at
prices lower (higher, resp.) than the current sale (purchase, resp.) prices and possibly speculating
on the prices’ evolution for making a profit. The tasks human market-makers perform can be
sen as HC.6
The Efficient Market Hypothesis [7] according to which market prices well reflect informa-
tions on the goods traded with makes sense because of a rarely perceived HC, namely the hu-
man activity necessary for the timely wide-spreading of the information the traders rely on for
5Biology teaches that role games in which real life activities are simulated are the premier form of learning among
mammals.
6An HC-based market-maker would be worth considering.
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their price adjustments. In other words, Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” ensuring markets’ self-
regulation [22, 19] is an invisible HC avant la lettre!7 This unperceived HC can be seen as a
further component of markets even though it traditionally takes place not on the markets them-
selves but in their surrounding social contexts.
Intransparency Compromises Markets
There are no reasons for markets to remain self-regulated and efficient if the afore mentioned
human activity becomes deficient. Today, it is sometimes deficient on many markets for a couple
of reasons:
Variety of goods traded with. While in the 18th century, as Adam Smith reflected on the
surprising ability of markets to self-regulate, it was possible for a trader to timely acquire both
the expertise and the information necessary for relatively accurate predictions on what he8 was
trading with, say, the next wheat harvest or the cattle’s health in his region, it is today hardly
possible even for credit experts to accurately compare the credit risks of home mortgages in, say,
Alabama, U.S.A., Bavaria, Germany, and Attica, Greece.
One of the reasons why the subprime mortgage crisis of 2008–2009 so strongly hit Europe is
first that few in Europe were aware to which extent consumer protection in the credit industry
was less developed in the U.S. than in Europe, second that almost nobody in Europe was –and
still is– aware that in some US states home mortgages need not be backed with more than the real
estate for the purchase of which they have been taken. In Europe a home mortgage is always
backed with the whole properties and all future income of the debtor. Also, up till the Greek
sovereign debt crisis of 2011–2012 almost no European and surely even less U.S. investors
buying securities backed with real estate in Greece were aware that this member country of the
European Union still has no cadastre (central land register).
Complexity of the goods traded with. Most goods traded with today are much more
complex than were the goods traded with only a century ago. This holds of technological goods,
of finance products and also of agricultural products.
Which traders do for example fully understand the perspectives of a nano-tech or IT start-
up? Also an insufficient understanding of derivatives by many investors, including some of the
bankers who traded with these financial products, and by the regulation agencies is among the
acknowledged causes of the current financial crisis [4, 10, 18].
Global markets. Today’s markets attract goods and traders from everywhere in the world
adding a cultural dimension to the variety and complexity of the goods traded with.
While the markets are global, the information on the goods traded with is largely local and, as
two of the examples given above illustrate, can be missing or be misunderstood in other world
regions than those where it originates from: Some U.S. home mortgages are more risky than
7“Unperceived HC” would be more to the point but we could not resist paraphrasing the celebrated expression.
8In 18th century England traders were male.
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European home mortgage, real estate is more risky in Greece than elsewhere in the developed
world.
Speed differential between transactions and information. On most markets, trans-
actions can be conducted today at a very high speed. In contrast, the information on the goods
traded with is widespread among the traders at a considerably lower speed.
This differential is dramatic on financial markets where algorithmic trading [14, 9] makes
it possible to react to index variations in fractions of seconds, credit risk estimates still are
computed by humans working mostly in committees delivering their updates at best weekly (for
example for the home mortgages of a region), at worst every quarter of a year (for example for
government bonds) [26, 1, 17, 2].
Financial Markets and Credit Risk Rating
On financial markets the information of relevance is the risk induced by financial instruments.
This risk is the likeliness that a debtor might fail to serve and reimburse her debt weighted by
the loss this failure would entail. On financial markets not only credit contracts of various kinds
(loans, mortgages, bills, and bonds) are traded with but also derivative contracts of many kinds
(futures, forwards, options, warrants, swaps among others credit default swaps (CDS) and con-
tingent credit default swaps (CCDS)) [5]. Technically, with a derivative there are no creditors
and no debtors because, when the derivative contract is entered, it is open in which direction
money will flow between the two contract parties. The payments specified in a derivatives can,
like with credits, fail to be honoured. Thus, while with a credit only the creditor assumes a
risk, with a derivative both parties in the derivative assume a risk. The risk induced by both,
derivatives and credits, is called “credit risk”. Abusing the terminology we shall call “debtor”
(“creditor”, resp.) a party in a derivative contract which has to perform (receive, resp.) a pay-
ment.
Assessing credit risk is an essential activity on financial markets called “credit risk rating”.
Creditor and parties in derivatives use sophisticated stochastic models, statistical methods and
complex procedures for credit risk rating [26, 1, 3, 17, 2] some of which are codified in national
and international regulations such as Basel II and III. In spite of a large corpus of models,
mathematical methods, procedures and regulations, credit risk rating remains awkward.
Today’s credit risk rating has been criticised for practical and methodological reasons. As of
practical criticisms, it is acknowledged that inaccurate risk assessment has been instrumental in
the subprime mortgage and the late–2000s financial crises [18] and that the widespread disre-
gard of the counterparty risk of derivatives has been one of the major causes of the late–2000s
financial crisis [18, 10].
As of methodological criticisms of credit risk rating, some –prominently Benoit Mandelbrot
[16] and Nassim Nicholas Taleb [24]– argue that, as it is currently based on stochastics, it is
not sufficiently scientifically founded. Furthermore, a folklore criticism is that, being performed
mostly by banks to display evidence of their financial health and by rating agencies on behalf,
and often at the expenses of, debtors that need good ratings for getting credits at good condi-
tions, current credit risk rating is not free from moral hazard. A further folklore observation is
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that credit risk rating is largely ineffective during bubbles. As a bubble booms, that is, some
prices keep raising more and over longer a period of time than usual, more and more traders get
seduced by the perspective of unexpected gains, loose their sense of risk and join in the frenzy
contributing to keep the price raising up till enough traders come to reason, what causes the
bust. Credit risk rating, as it is performed today, cannot keep with the pace of price raising dur-
ing bubbles’ booms.9 Another folklore observation, is that any market analysis including credit
risk rating has unexpected effects because of a reflexivity typical of economics: Market analyses
provide traders with additional information that often lead them to re-consider their actions.
Human Computation for Credit Risk Rating
The reflexivity mentioned at the end of the last section is where HC comes in.
We propose to collect risk estimates related to credits and derivatives from traders on finan-
cial market, to aggregate and publish these estimates as follows where (H) denote tasks to be
performed by human and (C) computerised tasks:
1. (H) Risk Estimation: Each debtor (including each party in a derivative) estimates the
risks she induces to her counterparties.
2. (C) Risk Consolidation: For each creditor or party in a derivative A the risk estimates of
its counterparties are consolidated, that is, aggregated, yielding a risk estimate for A.
3. (C) Risk Publication: Anonymised through meaningful aggregations, the risk estimates
computed at Step 2 are published.
Note the collecting of risk estimates from the “risk producers” or “debtors”, not from the “risk
takers” or “creditors” as with current credit risk rating. This unusual approach being free of
moral hazard aims at an earlier and more accurate risk assessment.
Recall the abuse of terminology in calling “debtor” (“creditor”, resp.) a party in a derivative
contract which has to perform (receive, resp.) a payment.
The HC scheme given above raises many questions. Why should debtors provide with their
own estimates of the risks they induce? This question is addressed below under “Incentive:
Grace Period Insurance”. Can risk estimates be aggregated in a meaningful manner? This
is discussed below under “Consolidated risk as eigenvector”. How can risk estimates provide
financial markets with information contributing to their self-regulation without compromising
the markets’ liquidity? This issue is addressed below under “Contributing to financial markets’
transparency”. The proposed scheme would be a significant interference in financial markets.
Could it be accepted? This question is discussed below under “Pragmatics”.
Incentive: Grace Period Insurance. The incentive we propose for debtors to disclose the
risks they induce to their counterparties is a Grace Period Insurance (GPI) functioning like a
9No methodological criticism of current credit risk rating can be derived from this since, being based on stochastic,
its outcomes do not apply to exceptional situations like bubbles. This is intellectually satisfying but does not help
for, in practice, bubbles happen.
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credit default insurance but, most importantly, only for a short period of time like three months.
The GPI can be activated by debtors at any time and for any coverage, that is, percentage, of
their outstanding payments. The GPI can also be deactivated at any time by debtors.
An activated GPI comes at a cost for debtors, what incites them only to activate it when they
see a need. The costs of an activated GPI are proportional to both the payment’s percentage
covered and its activation duration, making it reliable an estimate of the credit risk a debtor
perceives. The costs of an activated GPI are covered from a compulsory GPI deposit to be made
by debtors when entering a credit or derivative contract. The GPI deposit is lost by the debtor if
she defaults while the GPI is not activated and otherwise refunded up to the costs incurred from
activating the GPI. This deposit is set to be significantly higher than the costs of an activated
GPI. The possible loss of the GPI deposit and the value of this deposit both incite debtors to
activate the GPI accordingly to the risk of defaulting they perceive.
Finally, whether a given debtor activates the GPI or not is kept confidential. As discussed
below, only aggregated data on GPI activations are disclosed. This confidentiality ensures that
no moral hazard impairs the risk assessments deduced from GPI activations.
The GPI requires tuning: The GPI costs must be set according to insurances’ good practices
and the grace period must be defined possibly depending on businesses, types of credits, and
types of derivatives.
Note that risk assessment by means of the GPI does not conflict with standard credit risk
rating. Indeed, in deciding whether or not to activate the GPI, any financial risk and derivative
pricing method can be used.
Consolidated risks as eigenvector. Let i denote an economical agent involved in credit
or derivative contracts. Let cτi be the proportion of the total (notional) credit on the financial
market agent i is taking at time τ , Dτ (i) be the set of debtors and Cτ (i) the set of creditors of
i at time τ , “debtor” and “creditor” understood as recalled at the beginning of this section. Let
wτji ∈ [0, 1] express the likeliness as revealed by the GPI that agent j defaults to agent i at time
τ . Set wτii to a same arbitrary value in ]0, 1] for all i and τ .
The consolidated credit risk CCRτ (i) incurred by i at time τ is the following linear combi-
nation of the consolidated credit risks of its debtors Dτ (i)
CCRτ (i) =
∑
j∈Dτ (i)
cτi · wτji · CCRτ (j)
dτi
(1)
where dτi =
∑
k∈Cτ (j) cτk · wτjk. Equation 1 specifies a vector ~v, the components of which are
the consolidated credit risk incurred at time τ CCRτ (i), as follows
~v = Rτ~v (2)
where Rτ = (rτji) with
rτji =
{ cτi ·wτji
dτi
if dτi 6= 0
0 otherwise
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is the “conceptual risk matrix”. Define R′τ = (r′τji), the “risk matrix”, as follows
r′τji =
{ cτi ·wτji
dτi
= rτji if d
τ
i 6= 0
1
N otherwise
where N is the number of traders on the market. Rτ is not necessarily column-stochastic, but
R′τ is. R′τ can be interpreted as follows: A trader who is debtor of no one is treated as being
debtor of all traders in equal parts. In general, Equation 2 does not admit a solution, but the
following Equation 3 does:
~v = R′τ~v (3)
Whether such a solution is of practical interest depends on the credit risk graph R′τ is the adja-
cency matrix of. The matrixR′τ being real, non-negative and column-stochastic and each diago-
nal element of R′τ being positive, it follows from celebrated theorems by Perron and Frobenius
[21, 8, 30] that provided R′τ is irreducible, 1 is a simple and strictly dominant eigenvalue of
R′τ the eigenvector associated with is called Perron vector of R′τ . The irreducibility of R′τ is
equivalent to the graph it is the adjacency matrix of being strongly connected. We show below
that this is the case.
Since 1 is a simple eigenvalue of R′τ , the Perron vector of R′τ is the unique real solution of
Equation 3. This makes it acceptable a credit risk vector: If Equation 3 had several real solutions,
then here would be no reasons to choose the one instead of another as a credit risk vector.
Finally if a vector ~u is not orthogonal to the Perron vector of R′τ , then normalised power
sequences of R′τ and ~u converge to the Perron vector of R′τ . This makes it possible to apply the
power method to compute the Perron vector of R′τ .
The graphR′τ is the adjacency matrix of consists of nodes representing the traders on financial
markets: Private and social persons who take credits and handle with derivatives and financial
institutions which take and give credits and handle with derivatives. We include central banks as
additional nodes on the ground that the currencies they manage can be seen as credits (without
interests). If b is a central bank, then the currency it manages conveys at time τ a risk wτbi to
every trader in the currency zone of b. Set wbi = 1 for all i 6= b on the ground that a central bank
does not absorb any risk.10 It follows that the graph R′τ is the adjacency matrix of is a strongly
connected graph.
Setting the value of cτb requires tuning. An appropriate value would probably be close to∑
i∈T cτi where T is the set of all traders.
Contributing to financial markets’ transparency. The consolidated credit riskCCRτ (f)
of a financial institution f at time τ can be used as a bottom line: Regulations forbidding f ’s
own risk assessment to be much below CCRτ (f) would make sense. If f feels that its debtors
are too cautious, then it should publicly provide evidence for them to reduce their own risk esti-
mates, that is, exploit the afore mentioned reflexivity. CCRτ (f) would also help in setting f ’s
capital coverage less crudely than it is done today.
Aggregated credit risks over time intervals, for business branches, or for social groups could
be published so as to further exploit the afore mentioned reflexivity. Aggregated credit risks for
10CCRτ (b) expresses the risk associated with the currency of b.
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France or Greece would for example sustain, or disprove, the claims often made in Germany and
Finland that the former countries accepting too high credit risks.
Pragmatics. The scheme proposed requires that all derivatives being traded with being reg-
istered. However, it does not require that derivatives being traded through clearing houses like,
currently, futures are.
The scheme proposed can be applied in a single currency zone at the costs of possibly arbitrary
estimates for credit and derivative offers outside that currency zone.
The scheme proposed can be seen as a smooth, or continuous, “bailout in the small” the costs
of which are covered by the market through the grace period insurance (GPI). Arguably, this
would be preferable to the bailouts in the large that from time to time are so far needed and the
costs of which are not covered by the market. The GPI with its mandatory deposit can be seen as
a “Transaction tax [25] with a purpose” from which each trader as well as the financial market
as a whole benefit.
Finally, the HC credit risk rating can be seen as a “PageRank [20] for credit risk”. Deploying
it would amount to building up a “Google of credit risk”. An essential feature of the approach is
the taping in the reflexivity it gives rise to for an undelayed self-regulation of financial markets.
Conclusion
This position paper investigated economical aspects of Human Computation (HC) and perspec-
tives of HC in economics. The considerable perspectives both fields have for each other have
been demonstrated on several examples among other a HC-based approach to credit risk rating.
The author is convinced that much of the future of HC lies with economics and that credit risk
rating, and more generally markets, in the future will exploit HC, if not exactly as proposed in
this article, none the less in a similar manner.
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